


Being Human Beings: The Domains and a Human Realm

by

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas G. Vincent
United States Army



United States Army War College
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Lieutenant Colonel Douglas G. Vincent
United States Army

Colonel Robert M. Balcavage
Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

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The US Army and the Special Operations Command have made an effort to recognize the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and are working to emerge from the recent conflicts a more adaptable, capable and agile force. The entire military profession understands that the future holds a multitude of challenges, some which the military and the nation are prepared to face, and many which will require growth and adaptation to overcome. An initiative that places the human component, the art of war, at the forefront of conflict as a human domain is already well underway within the Army and the Special Operations communities. While this initiative is a positive and necessary step, it is neither radical nor far reaching enough to help generate a true revolution in military thought. Accordingly, doctrine must be revised to incorporate the concept of a Human Realm to unify endeavors and face the uncertain challenges of a future environment that will be dominated, as it always has been, by humanity. The coming decades may require advances in military science, but they will demand a revolution in the art of war.

Being Human Beings: The Domains and a Human Realm

Did ever man believe in the existence of human things, and not human beings?

—Socrates

If the history of warfare teaches anything, it is that war is both art and science. The science of war is the battlefield calculus, the engineered systems and the established doctrine that guides the employment of forces and weapons. But what is the art of war? The experience and intuition of a commander, the esprit-de-corps of an army, the resiliency of a population; this nebulous, human component is the art. It recognizes the critical and central role humanity plays in war, yet it is repeatedly the most overlooked and least understood factor. Sun Tzu recognized that war surpassed the mere maneuvering of forces and consisted of a human component beyond the control of a general composed of mental, moral, physical and circumstantial factors.¹ He also understood that the human component is far more unpredictable and vital than the basic battlefield calculus normally prescribed too. Clausewitz accounted for this human component in his writings. He described war as an object suspended between the three magnets of the people, the armed forces and the government.²

Yet despite the importance these experts place upon the human component, this lesson has been continually forgotten. The hard truth of the central role humanity played in the Vietnam War was lost in the aftermath of the United States' withdrawal. Henry Kissinger recognized this oversight when he stated that America believed so deeply in the appeal of its values that it could not understand the difficulty in establishing a democracy in a nation influenced by Confucius and impacted by external

forces.³ If one was to substitute Islam for Confucianism, this same statement could apply to the recent frustrations in the Middle East. In fact, if the United States had revisited history prior to commencing operations in Afghanistan and invading Iraq, a certain undeniable error might have been prevented. The error was failing to fully account for the most important component of war; the human component. In light of the valuable and painful lessons learned over the past ten years, and understanding the volatile, uncertain, chaotic and ambiguous environment of the future, the United States cannot afford to relapse into an overly scientific approach to war.

Accordingly, national and military doctrine needs to be revised to account for the key and singular role humans play in war. Many in the military community have reached this same obvious conclusion, and an intellectual debate is underway that states that the human component is so critical to conflict that it should be added to the existing domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber as a sixth domain, called the human domain. While this initiative is commendable, it does not adequately emphasize the importance of the human component in war. It may demonstrate to the profession and to an external audience that the military is a learning organization that recognizes the need to evolve, but it suffers for that very reason. The human domain initiative is an evolution in military theory, not a revolution. By utilizing existing terminology, it does not generate the significant and dramatic change required to force adaptations in the system. To create a human domain is to place the element of humanity on the same plane as the existing five domains. It is to risk demoting the central importance of humanity by creating another separate yet equal domain. Considering the complex and interrelated environment of the future, a conceptual framework is required that unifies

the existing domains. Accordingly, a more innovative and radical concept is required. Current doctrine needs to be improved to incorporate a concept that unifies the domains and accounts for the preeminent and central role of the human component in war. The United States' security strategy, joint doctrine and Army doctrine should be revised to create a Human Realm. A Human Realm would create a central and controlling construct containing the existing domains to unite the national efforts of the United States and fully account for the human component in conflict.

Humans and History

Humanity, or the human component, is the universal theme that dominates every aspect of life on earth. It is the central element of culture, history and religion. It is the solitary factor that provides relevance to every action or effort undertaken by man, from Napoleon's conquest, to Stalin's atrocities, to the horrific attacks of al-Qa'ida. The human component provides the five recognized domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber relevance and value. A nautical mile of ocean without a ship sailing across it is merely water. A dominant hilltop without an enemy to recognize its importance and occupy it is nothing more than a geographical landmark. A bomb detonated outside the Golden Mosque without a population to sway is merely a violent chemical reaction.

When considering the historical context of the human component in warfare, it becomes apparent that the domains only have value as they apply to humans. But existing US doctrine fails to fully account for the central role the human component plays in war. The military repeatedly learns this lesson in combat but fails to account for it in times of peace. The initiatives learned by the United States during the Vietnam War, like the Hamlet Program and the concept of winning "hearts and minds," had to be relearned during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The concept of "clear,

hold, build” and the formation of teams specifically focused on the population, like Human Terrain and Female Engagement Teams, were created after the conflict commenced to account for the human component. And though the recent US Army and Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency Manual certainly place greater emphasis on the human component in an insurgency, it is a conviction overlooked in conventional doctrine. Robert Gates noted this shortcoming when he stated that, “...in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, one of the most important lessons...relearned is that military success is not sufficient... These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed, to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective.”⁴ And politics, as Aristotle stated, is clearly an aspect of the human component since, “man is by nature a political animal.”⁵

Some of the blame for this oversight could be attributed to the exhaustion that follows protracted conflicts. The Roman historian Tacitus said, “The profession of the soldier is forgotten in a quiet peace, and peace reduces the enterprising and indolent to an equality.”⁶ But most of the fault must lie with the military profession, resistant to move towards the nebulous concepts of the art of war and instead relapsing into the comfort of the military sciences. The scientific philosopher Thomas Kuhn understood the difficulty in enacting revolutionary change in a conservative organization when the organization is accustomed to using a set framework, or paradigm, to solve problems.⁷ He stated that a conservative mindset will only be abandoned, causing a “paradigm shift” or revolution to occur, when a crisis causes a lack of confidence in the existing framework.⁸ The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the uncertain environment

of the future constitute such a crisis. In order to prevent the mistakes of the past and prepare for the wars of the future, there must be a paradigm shift in the principles that guide the application of military power.

Current United States Military Doctrine

Accordingly, a review of the shortcomings in existing doctrine is required to support the intellectual revolution necessary to face the coming uncertainty. The military profession clearly understands the volatile challenges the future will present. The Army Capstone Concept states that, “Technology will never deliver everything we need to know about our adversaries. Army forces must first strive to understand the situation in depth, width and context, then develop the situation through action, adjusting the approach over time as needed. To understand our enemies’ capabilities, intentions, morale and level of support among the civilian population, we have to think, act, learn and then adapt.”⁹ The requirement to analyze and account for the human component in war is recognized, but a unifying construct within doctrine that drives the analysis is still missing.

In US Military Doctrine, only the design methodology considers the human component before other environmental factors. Organizations analyze the operational environment and the problem and evaluate potential solutions when conducting design. The “...operational environment encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these areas are all enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation.”¹⁰ In framing the operational environment, the organization must “...identify motivations and agendas among the relevant actors with regard to the desired transformation. They consider factors that influence these

motivations and agendas.”¹¹ They evaluate tendencies, tensions, and other factors that influence social, cultural, and ideological forces.¹² The organization also considers the human component through the lens of the cultural analytical framework, a construct which looks at culture, sociology and history to understand the motivations of humans. To further understand and describe the environment and the human component, an organization next conducts a thorough systems-based process that considers all relationships using the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure (PMESII) framework.

Though it may be apparent that doctrine, at least from a design standpoint, considers the human component in conflict, a disconnect arises when the military attempts to translate these factors from the language of strategic design down through campaigns and into operations executed by Soldiers on the ground that actually interact with humans. Human motivational factors easily become lost within the technical analysis when dissecting the elements of PMESII in broad operational language. A common framework that unites the basic factors of the human component, applicable to all levels of conflict and all consumers, is required. Additionally, even if the design methodology considers the human component, if it is not accounted for across the totality of military doctrine, it will continue to be overlooked or disregarded.

The Joint Operational Access Concept states that in the future, geographic access will be challenged, and to meet that threat “future joint forces will leverage cross-domain synergy.”¹³ The Access Concept acknowledges the fact that efforts must be combined across domains, but what is currently missing is a central construct that drives this effort. The United States’ supremacy as a military power depends on the

ability to dominate the operating environment which “encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace).”¹⁴ Joint Publication 3-31, defines the land domain as “the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark”, while Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, fails to provide a definition.¹⁵ The dictionary of military terms defines the maritime domain as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the air space above these, including the littorals”¹⁶ and defines the air domain as “the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible.”¹⁷ Joint Publication 3-59 defines the space domain as “the earth’s ionosphere and magnetosphere, interplanetary space and the solar atmosphere”¹⁸ and Joint Publication 1-02 states that the cyber domain is “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”¹⁹ What is missing from the joint literature, despite the inclusion of rudimentary definitions of the existing domains, is an accurate and common description of the human component in conflict and how it spans all the domains.

National security strategy, joint doctrine and Army doctrine also fall short in making the human component the formal and central theme that guides planning. An example would be the US strategy produced in 2009 by the National Security Advisor to provide presidential strategic guidance and objectives for operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The document, declassified after appearing as a source in the Bob

Woodward book, *Obama's Wars*, describes how the United States was setting conditions for a US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The book reveals that despite significant discussions within the National Security Council on the human component of the war in Afghanistan, a significant obstacle was minimized in the published guidance. Notable in its absence from the strategy was a significant discussion on resolving a key element at the heart of the Afghan problem; the will of the people and their issue with the legitimacy of the Afghan government.²⁰ The National Security Strategy²¹, National Defense Strategy²² and National Military Strategy²³ consider human factors like ideology, resiliency, quality of life and the uncertain environment the United States can expect to face. But a whole of government approach, like the one utilized to strengthen capacities, should be incorporated to account for the effect the human component has on strategic problems. A common framework would guide all the departments of the government in devising a collective national strategy that preeminently accounts for the human component.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, recognizes the nature of war as "...a violent clash of wills. War is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules" and correctly labels human involvement and the specter of chance as the art of war.²⁴ The publication also discusses the fluid and dynamic nature of the strategic environment as consisting of "...continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats"²⁵ and reviews the religious, cultural and psychological challenges to multinational operations, but despite this, it still only accounts for the human component as a mere ingredient of the environment, not as a central and critical

component.²⁶ The same can be said of Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, which provides a brief discussion of the challenges of the strategic environment being driven by the human condition²⁷ and discusses how, "...successful commanders can strike a balance between the 'art of war' (human interaction) and the 'science of war' (technological solutions) by emphasizing the inherently human aspects of warfare."²⁸ Yet, despite this acceptance of the human component and its relation to the art of war, the publication does not possess a single chapter; heading or sub-heading that discusses the human component in war as the central theme and subject. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, also fails to adequately account for the critical role of humanity in conflict. The publication states that the key to operational planning is the "...commander's description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the operational environment and the problem."²⁹ As stated at the beginning of this section, joint doctrine has already defined the operating environment as consisting of numerous factors of the five domains and the information environment, but the planning publication fails to give the human component a central role in its doctrinal considerations. It isn't until the chapter on operational art and design, over one hundred pages into the publication, that the importance of the human component in determining centers of gravity is discussed. Like the joint operations publication and the joint planning publication, the bulk of joint doctrine does not include a single chapter or heading dedicated solely to the crucial human component in conflict.

US Army doctrine either overlooks or undervalues the importance of humanity in war. Doctrine, according to the Army Unified Land Operations publication, is "...a

statement of how the Army intends to fight. In this sense, doctrine often describes an idealized situation and then contrasts the ideal with the reality Army leaders can expect. Doctrine provides a means of conceptualizing campaigns and operations, as well as a detailed understanding of conditions, frictions, and uncertainties that make achieving the ideal difficult.”³⁰ The logical assumption would be that because war is a conflict between humans, the human component would be featured relative to its importance. The Department of the Army Operating Concept, designed to guide the US Army’s efforts for the next eighteen years, discusses the human challenges of the future, including threats arising in diverse populations, extremist individuals and demographic trends.³¹ The concept also highlights that “...human, psychological, political, and cultural dimensions of conflict and the uniqueness of local conditions make military operations on land inherently complex and uncertain.”³² It discusses the Army’s use of Mission Command and Combined Arms Maneuver to defeat the enemy and the co-creation of context. However, though the concept certainly recognizes the critical importance of a people, particularly in regards to intelligence focusing beyond just the enemy, it and existing doctrine still fails to place the human component in a fundamental role. Army Doctrine Publication 1 states on the very first page that, “The land domain is the most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity—its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics. War begins and ends based upon how it affects the land domain.”³³ In doing so, Publication 1 at least succeeds where joint doctrine has failed, accounting for the critical component of humanity in warfare right at the forefront, even if only in passing. The publication sets a nice precedent that is, unfortunately, not reflected in the rest of the doctrine. Army Publication 3-0, Army Operations, reviews the

operating environment that Army units will fight in, relative to a specific situation or the accepted domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber. It lists the operating variables consisting of factors like political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time, but as with joint doctrine, it treats the human component as a subordinate factor of the operating environment. The remainder of Army Doctrine, with the exception of the counter-insurgency manual, likewise addresses the human component in warfare as a subordinate element of the operating environment, similar to terrain or weather, as opposed to a fundamental framework.

Special Operations doctrine is more thorough in accounting for a human component by necessity, but it also falls short of the mark of establishing it as the unifying factor in warfare. Special Operations Command Publication 1 states that the first of the twelve operating imperatives of Special Operations Forces (SOF) is that SOF must understand the operational environment and that they, "...achieve objectives by understanding and developing plans to act within the realities of specific operational environments, including diplomatic, political, military, economic, financial, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, psychological, and others. They must know the friendly and hostile decision makers, objectives and strategies, and how they interact."³⁴ In highlighting the importance of the human component in the first of its imperatives, SOF at least places it at the forefront of analysis and operations. Publication 1 also provides a more in-depth treatment of the human component in its dissertation on the current operating environment, and the role humans play in the endeavor of war. The publication says that Special Operations are "...population-focused, networked force to

influence, enable, and integrate friendly nations, partners, and populations.”³⁵ But, like the rest of the doctrinal library, neither Publication 1 nor the remainder of Special Operations literature contain the desired single unifying framework or construct that accounts for the human component.

The other services also gloss over the central role of the human component in warfare. The Marine Corps’ Operating Concept highlights the fact that the Army, Navy and Air Force are and have been focused on the specific domains of Land, Maritime and Air, and that where “...domain-optimized forces have experienced friction is at the seams between the domains and in responding to sudden changes from the expected character of conflict. Unlike the other Services, the Marine Corps have not relied on a single geographic domain to ensure our place in national defense and service to the Nation.”³⁶ While the concept is certainly correct in emphasizing that services experience friction on the seams of domains, and partially accounts for the human component in war as a change in the character of a conflict, it fails to highlight that the greatest friction is perhaps caused by the fact that doctrine lacks a central paradigm to account for the human component. The Marines Concept also states that their “...philosophy is based on an acknowledgment that ‘we cannot predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we must prepare ourselves,’ as well as in the final analysis ‘the ultimate determination in war is the man on the scene with the gun’.”³⁷ The concept states that due to a lack of prejudice over domains, the Corps is more willing to look past standard solutions and consider new techniques, methods and concepts. Accordingly, the Marine Corps should be the first to recognize the requirement for a construct that supersedes the current domains and establishes a central and controlling Human

Realm. The Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Marine Corps Operations, accounts for the various factors influenced by humans in the expeditionary operations chapter that discusses design and planning, but as with Army doctrine, the human component is more an aspect of the environment.³⁸ So despite a tacit acceptance by Marine Corps doctrine of the human nature of war, it still falls short of placing a human component into a fundamental role for consideration and planning.

The large majority of US Navy and US Air Force doctrine is, not surprisingly, more aligned with the science of war, focused on technological superiority and military advancements to influence the outcome of regional events as opposed to accounting for the far more difficult to quantify human part of the equation. The latest operational concept driving Navy and Air Force initiatives in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO) in the near future, the AirSea Battle Concept, states that “AirSea Battle rests fundamentally on the tight integration of Air Force and Navy operations in the WPTO—each Service plays a key enabling role for the other in accomplishing critical missions.”³⁹ AirSea Battle discusses the nature of a potential confrontation between the Chinese military and the United States in the region and outlines a proposed departure strategy to counter the threat. The concept draws parallels between growing Chinese assertiveness and past competition with the Soviet Union. AirSea Battle is a valid departure point for forecasting potential friction in the region and by design purely looks at the technological aspect of any future conflict. Additionally, it is a concept focused on the initial phases of a conflict, and perhaps this accounts for a disregard of the human component. However, it is still dangerous to base a long-term national strategy on any single forecast that fails to account for the human component,

like the influence of the largest population in the world. An example of a shortcoming of this magnitude would be to draw the same parallel the AirSea Battle Concept does and look at the past relationship with the Soviet Union. While the United States certainly took military measures to prepare for the Soviet threat (and future threats should continue to be countered), no one accounted for the will of the Soviet population and the risks that one man, Mikhail Gorbachev, was willing to take to change his society for the better.

So why does current doctrine fail? If the relationship between the environment and the domains was depicted graphically, it would appear similar to the Current View Figure shown below.




Figure 1:

In the Current View Figure, humanity is not depicted since it is normally accounted for in both strategy and doctrine as a subordinate factor of the environment. Yet based on the various operating concepts reviewed, there is an understanding of the central role of humanity in war. Doctrine, however, has not been revised to account for it and a central

and unifying framework does not exist that unites concepts across all levels of conflict and across all domains.

The Argument for a Human Domain

A Proceedings article on the shifting domain of war stated that:

What has happened has been a decisive shift in the trajectory of war, away from an evolution of greater machine technology back to the human domain. The technology our opponents use against us is widely available, including bombs, rockets, and sniper rifles. Further, the fight will be in the human domain of ideas and culture-by Web site and on Al Jazeera, in the minds of suicide bombers and those who fear them. Our advanced machines are not irrelevant in this war. But faced with limited resources, we must objectively assess our existing and emerging technologies to find those most effective in the human domain.⁴⁰

The human domain has been recently defined in a Special Operations white paper as the "...totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military campaign or operation depends on the application of unique capabilities that are defined to fight and win population-centric conflicts."⁴¹ The Special Operations Command initiative to develop a human domain is based on the principle that a human domain is needed "...to focus Army efforts to address human factors external to our own forces in a manner similar to the Army's internal focus on the human dimension."⁴² The current initiative would establish a human domain that is critical and complementary to the acknowledged domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber.⁴³ The proposed human domain, quantified as an image, would be similar to the Initiative Figure used in a recent US Army Special Operations Command briefing and shown below, where humanity becomes a separate domain.




Figure 2:⁴⁴

The concept depicted is certainly an improvement over the past and current role humanity plays in doctrine, but as shown, it creates a separate yet equal domain, not a preeminent and controlling construct. According to a US Army White Paper that was produced by the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE), the necessity of establishing a human domain was proven over the last ten years. The United States learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that to ignore the human element in war is to invite disaster. The MCOE paper states that “The Human Domain cannot be controlled or managed by technical means or capabilities; it requires human contact – person to person interaction – with duration and persistence over time that enables commanders to determine who the enemy is, where the enemy is and what his likely intentions are.”⁴⁵ The white paper also correctly states that the “...domains shape the environment in which the enemy will reside and therefore shape the human terrain in which our Soldiers and Marines will operate in. But, it is through shaping efforts in the human domain that affect the population, positively enabling us to effectively root out the enemy and causing him to expose himself” where national objectives are achieved.⁴⁶ Finally, the paper correctly

captures the crucial importance of accounting for the human component in achieving overall victory. It states that dominating the human domain has five requirements: (1) holistic understanding of complex human networks on the ground; (2) Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational communication, cooperation, and collaboration along both lethal and non-lethal lines of operations; (3) understanding of who the enemy is; (4) knowledge of the chaotic and continuously changing environment on the ground; (5) bottom-up information and intelligence to identify all the pieces of the puzzle through the tactical, operational and strategic level.⁴⁷ Finally, the MCOE paper concludes with the salient point that a "...human domain, coupled with the land domain, is the crux for decisive action for our Army as the nation's strategic land power."⁴⁸ The Special Operations Command and MCOE white paper arguments for a human domain are both compelling and correct, but they fail due to a lack of reach. In employing terminology already utilized in doctrine, the initiative implies that the human component is equal to the other existing domains. In the words of the initiative stated above; the human domain would be critical and complementary to the acknowledged domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber.⁴⁹ But it is the human component that provides the existing domains value and dominates them. To create a framework that is complementary and equal to the existing domains is to create an evolution in Army doctrine, when what is required is a revolutionary paradigm shift.

The Recommendation for a Human Realm

Is it necessary, then, to revise doctrine to include a Human Realm when the human component is already considered when assessing the environment? After considering history and existing military publications, the United States needs to revise doctrine to capture the lessons learned in the past and place the proper emphasis on

the human component, and the arguments stated above support this proposal. Does the current initiative to create a human domain provide this emphasis? As stated previously, the desire to create a human domain, while important, is an evolutionary step to highlight the human component in conflict. As Francis Bacon said, “It would be an unused fancy and self-contradictory to expect that things which have never yet been done can be done except by means which have never yet been tried.”⁵⁰ A revolution in doctrine is necessary to do things which have not been done, correct errors of the past and capture the imaginations of strategic leaders and the military profession.

What is required in doctrine is not merely another domain that incorporates the human component, but an entirely new construct that places the human component in a fundamental and guiding role running from the national strategic level down to the tactical squad on the ground, and simultaneously unifies the existing domains. The National Defense University Strategic Forum highlights the central role of the human component in future conflicts, and emphasizes the requirement to adjust doctrine to meet the challenges of the future.⁵¹ The article stressed that in the future gaining access to global commons will be difficult, influenced by an increasingly linked world that creates interrelated domains.⁵² Additionally, the article states that “the traditional approach to military concept development for the global commons has been domain-centric (maritime, air, space, and so forth). This planning construct, one of geographic ‘stovepipes,’ does not properly account for the complexities of domain interrelationships.”⁵³ What the article proposes is a new paradigm that seeks synergy by recognizing the interrelationship between the domains.⁵⁴

A Human Realm would not only emphasize the preeminent place the human component holds in war, but could focus the existing domains within it as a framework for all planning. It would provide a counter to a traditional Pentagon planning process that Michele Flournoy, of the Center for a New American Security, recently criticized as being “unsatisfactory” and “stale” and might help avoid a Vietnam syndrome in the future.⁵⁵ A Human Realm paradigm that analyzes specific vital aspects of the human component first and foremost, and is applicable to all levels of planning from strategy to tactics, would create a common vision and unity of effort, two critical aspects to mission success. It would support General Dempsey’s recent observation in his strategic guidance that “we need innovation in how we operate – our ability to re-imagine the way we fight will determine if we succeed or fail.”⁵⁶

The Human Realm would focus future concepts and create additional Doctrinal, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Educational, Personnel, Facility and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions that would address the human component. It would feature in existing doctrine as a central theme. It would be incorporated into doctrinal planning and be a preeminent factor in the initial chapters of key publications. The Human Realm would place the focus of any effort first and foremost on the human component. Policy and strategy equate to influence, and the purpose of both is to utilize the elements of national power to influence another entity to succumb to national desires. By creating a Human Realm at the forefront of doctrine, any process would commence with a standard analysis of it, accounting for people, desires, persuasions and behavior. After the Human Realm is analyzed, an informed policy or strategy could be crafted that uses the elements of national power to apply persuasion within the

Human Realm to create a desired outcome. If the military is the primary element of national power employed, then the proper balance of force could be utilized across the five domains to achieve a strategic objective. Though this may not be so foreign from the process already utilized, it further accentuates the central role of humanity by codifying it as a Human Realm within all doctrine, and by using one term and definition.

A Human Realm would be defined as all potential aspects of humanity and human influence within the operating environment. The Human Realm would exist within the environment, but it would be the central and fundamental component that shapes, motivates and impacts the environment and all the domains. The accepted domains would exist within the environment because of the Human Realm. The Human Realm would provide the domains value. As compared to the existing position of humanity within the environment as shown in the Current Role Figure (Figure 1) and the potential role humanity would play if incorporated as shown in the Initiative Figure (Figure 2), the human component would play the central and unifying role as the Human Realm, proposed below.




Figure 3:

The Integration of the Human Realm

By integrating a Human Realm into National Strategy, Joint and US Army doctrine, it would create a common paradigm that places the human component at the forefront of all intellectual and planning efforts and unites military activities. The Human Realm would be incorporated into planning doctrine using a common framework that would be applicable from design, through the Joint Operations Planning Process down to the tactical level Military Decision Making Process. It would provide a single framework that would ensure a nested vision and a common analysis of the impact of the human component on a conflict, regardless of and superlative to the individual domains. When conducting design, the Human Realm would be considered immediately upon initiating the methodology, with the planners examining five essential factors that would simultaneously help inform the environment, the problem and potential solutions. Planners would analyze: (1) critical key actors; (2) actors' desired end-states or conditions; (3) what the United States sees as acceptable behavior to realize these desires; (4) methods of persuasion available to influence behavior; (5) friction points that exist between desires, acceptable behavior and persuasion. An analysis of the five points of the Human Realm would create an understanding of the environment, help outline the problem by initially capturing the basic issues and conflicts and begin to create solutions simultaneously, since the method and results fall into all three areas of design. Graphically portrayed, the process would appear as depicted in the Human Realm Analysis (Figure 4) below.

HUMAN REALM ANALYSIS				
Critical Key Actor	Desired End-state	Acceptable Behavior	Friction Points	Methods Of Persuasion
Persia	Regional Dominance & International Prestige	Responsible Growth and Influence in region	Isolation precludes Pressure/Sanctions	Sanctions/Military FDOs International Pressure
Mesopotamia	Stability and Sovereignty	Multilateral approach to Border issues	Persian influence w/in borders	Military Alliance and trade agreements
Operating Environment				
Problem				
Samaria	Regime Survival	Responsible Growth and	Isolation precludes	Sanctions/Military FDOs International Pressure
Solution				
Assyria	Restoration of Sovereignty	Internal Resistance and Alliance with Coalition	Persian occupation	Necessity due to Persian aggression

Figure 4:

The example analysis depicted above is neither novel nor drastically new. The key difference is that an analysis of the Human Realm would be the first thing completed in the design methodology, and would be revisited as required, not only during the design process, but upon the initiation of operations, and at all subordinate levels down to tactical units. Within Operational Design, a planner would again conduct the Human Realm Analysis (HRA) as the first step of describing the operating environment, prior to delving into the detailed and laborious PMESII analysis, where the base desires of the human component can easily become lost in the maze of water treatment plant assessments and accounting for a nation's internet providers.⁵⁷ At the joint operational level, the planner would conduct the HRA during mission analysis, after reviewing planning guidance and as a part of determining know facts and assumptions.⁵⁸ Additionally, the results of the HRA would be incorporated into the In-Progress Review (IPR) process briefed to the Secretary of Defense, starting with the initial IPR-A, or assumptions, through the final IPR for approval.⁵⁹ In doing so, it would

increase visibility on the nature of the human component to strategic leaders and the planning staff would be forced to consistently re-evaluate the HRA. At subordinate levels, the HRA would begin with an examination of the analysis from the higher headquarters during the review of the planning guidance, followed by an internal assessment, refined for the operational and tactical level of war, during mission analysis. Revisions would occur throughout the planning process and the results included in the brief-back process.

Operational doctrine would also be revised to include a thorough discussion of the Human Realm, with the initial chapters of the primary publications being rewritten to discuss the definition, key factors and importance of the Human Realm on military operations. The Human Realm chapter would include an overview on what constitutes a key actor, the motivation behind a desired political or social end-state and how to define them, how to identify acceptable behaviors out of national level strategy or guidance from higher headquarters, ways to describe methods of persuasion, what causes friction points and how they factor into problem and mission statements. Historical precedent and case studies could be utilized to expound on critical successes and failures in regards to understanding the Human Realm during past conflicts. The inclusion of the Human Realm at the forefront of operational doctrine would place immediate emphasis on the importance of the human component, ensure planners and staff alike understand the nuances of the Human Realm, know how to account for it and incorporate its factors into operational plans.

The Army Chief of Staff recognizes that the Army will be “compelled to rapidly adapt in order to defeat new unforeseen threats as they present themselves in

unexpected ways. Our challenge then is to build an Army whose leaders and Soldiers are comfortable with change and can rapidly adapt themselves, their units and even the institution as a whole to prevail in the future.”⁶⁰ The presence of a Human Realm at the forefront of military doctrine would be a catalyst to force the Army to prepare for these unforeseen threats and would influence organization, education, recruitment, training and the equipping of the force, creating more agile and adaptive units. It would start by including the definition and a brief description of the Human Realm into the Army Posture Statement, and populate outward into publications, command philosophies, education programs, professional development and training.

Though the focus of this project is not to delve into the individual initiatives that may arise out of the doctrinal adoption of a Human Realm, a brief overview of potential changes will help inform the reader of the impact this proposal might have on the military. Tactical units would reorganize to better address the Human Realm, with subordinate units potentially trained to mirror or counter hybrid threats, incorporate or simulate human terrain teams and other population focused capabilities. Brigade Combat Team staffs would be reorganized to permanently include personnel with special skill sets, or at least assign additional duties, like language capabilities, psychology, profiling, cultural understanding and history. Military recruiting would be refined to acquire a broader array of personalities than currently sought. Potential recruits might complete a psychological profile to seek out stability, initiative and intuition. Basic training programs would continue to enforce discipline, but might also develop more intuitive Soldiers trained to operate as sensors as well. The officer corps would focus less on the sciences, though a solid education would still be important, and would place

more emphasis on philosophy, history, culture and languages. ROTC and the United States Military Academy would dedicate time to educating future leaders on the Human Realm. Officer basic and advance courses would continue to account for the human component in training, but might incorporate more advanced ideas like asymmetrical approaches, profiling and futuring. Even after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, units would continue to incorporate a human component into exercises to maintain a dynamic, fluid and unpredictable environment. The Army might also accelerate or revise the initiative to link Soldiers on the battlefield and truly create a Soldier as sensor smart system that links every Soldier on the ground through mobile wireless systems and smart-pads, producing a linked formation that is more connected to the people in the environment and better situated to influence them. Placing a Human Realm at the center of all doctrine can revolutionize the force to face the challenges of the future.

Conclusion

The US Army and the Special Operations Command both understand the lessons of the past and are working to emerge from the recent conflict a more adaptable, capable and agile force. The entire military profession concedes the fact that the future holds a multitude of challenges, some which the military and the nation are prepared to face, and many which will require growth and adaptation to overcome. An initiative that places the human component at the forefront of conflict is already well underway in the Army and within the Special Operations community. While this initiative is a positive and necessary step, it is neither radical nor far reaching enough to help generate a true revolution in military thought. Accordingly and in conclusion, doctrine must be revised to incorporate the concept of a Human Realm to face the uncertain challenges of a future environment that will be dominated, as it always has

been, by humanity. The coming decades may require military science, but they will demand the art of war.

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